
Mitigating the psychologically detrimental effects of supervisor undermining: Joint effects of voice and political skill

human relations

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Abstract

three-way interactions), and that this buffering effect is realized through mitigating the adverse effects of supervisor undermining on employee psychological empowerment. In contrast, when employees possess low levels of political skill, engaging in high levels of voice exacerbates the detrimental effects of supervisor undermining on employee psychological empowerment, and subsequently decreases employee work-related well-being and heightens employee turnover intention. The theoretical and practical implications of our findings are discussed.

Keywords

political skill, psychological empowerment, supervisor undermining, voice

Abstract

Political skill

Psychological empowerment

Supervisor undermining

Voice

Work-related well-being

Turnover intention

Employee

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Supervisor undermining and employee psychological empowerment

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Supervisor undermining and employee psychological empowerment

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Joint moderating effects of employee voice and political skill

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Method

Participants and procedures

Participants were 266 employees of a Chinese firm in a public utility company in China. They were 25 years old on average (SD = 3.50), and were mostly female (63.16%). They were assigned to two groups: 130 in the experimental group and 136 in the control group. The experimental group was further divided into two subgroups: 65 in the experimental group 1 and 65 in the experimental group 2. The control group was also divided into two subgroups: 68 in the control group 1 and 68 in the control group 2. All participants were assigned to their respective groups randomly. They were paid a fixed amount of 300 yuan (approximately 45 USD) for their participation. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the university.

Measures

All data were collected at two time points (Time 1 and Time 2), which were 3 months apart. At Time 1, participants completed a questionnaire measuring their perception of their supervisor's undermining behavior and their political skill. At Time 2, participants completed a questionnaire measuring their voice and psychological empowerment. The questionnaire was administered online. All participants gave their informed consent before participating in the study.

Supervisor undermining (Time 1) was measured using a 10-item scale developed by Walumbwa and Schriesheim (1996), which assesses various undermining behaviors such as undermining the employee's authority, undermining the employee's reputation, and undermining the employee's work. The scale has a Cronbach's alpha of .96.

Political skill (Time 1) was measured using a 10-item scale developed by Ferris et al. (2005), which assesses various political skills such as social astuteness, interpersonal influence, networking capability, and Machiavellianism. The scale has a Cronbach's alpha of .92.

Voice (Time 2) was measured using a 5-item scale developed by Walumbwa and Schriesheim (2007), which assesses various voice behaviors such as speaking up, speaking out, and speaking forward. The scale has a Cronbach's alpha of .89.

Psychological empowerment (Time 2) was measured using a 4-item scale developed by Walumbwa and Schriesheim (1995), which assesses various dimensions of psychological empowerment such as sense of meaning, sense of competence, sense of self-efficacy, and sense of influence. The scale has a Cronbach's alpha of .93.

Work engagement (Time 3) $\beta = .17$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [.09, .25]$.
 Job satisfaction (Time 3) $\beta = .15$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [.07, .23]$.
 Turnover intention (Time 3) $\beta = -.12$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [-.20, -.04]$.

Control variables: Age $\beta = .02$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [.01, .03]$.
 Gender $\beta = .01$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [.00, .02]$.
 Education $\beta = .01$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [.00, .02]$.
 Income $\beta = .01$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [.00, .02]$.
 Tenure $\beta = .01$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [.00, .02]$.
 Job tenure $\beta = .01$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [.00, .02]$.
 Job tenure squared $\beta = -.0001$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [-.0002, -.0001]$.

Control variables: Age $\beta = .02$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [.01, .03]$.
 Gender $\beta = .01$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [.00, .02]$.
 Education $\beta = .01$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [.00, .02]$.
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 Job tenure squared $\beta = -.0001$, $p < .001$, $95\% CI [-.0002, -.0001]$.

Results

Measurement model. We tested a second-order CFA model with three first-order factors (work engagement, job satisfaction, and turnover intention) and 12 indicators. The fit indices were: $\chi^2(303, N = 257) = 618.20$, $CFI = 0.95$, $RMSEA = 0.04$, $NFI = 0.94$, $GFI = 0.96$, $TLI = 0.96$, $IFI = 0.96$, $PNFI = 0.96$. All indicators loaded on their respective factors ($\beta > .50$, $p < .001$).

Structural model. We tested a path model with three latent variables and three observed variables. The fit indices were: $\chi^2(266, N = 257) = 618.20$, $CFI = 0.95$, $RMSEA = 0.04$, $NFI = 0.94$, $GFI = 0.96$, $TLI = 0.96$, $IFI = 0.96$, $PNFI = 0.96$. All paths were significant ($\beta > .10$, $p < .05$).

Hypothesis 1: We predicted that work engagement would be positively related to job satisfaction ($\beta = .17$, $p < .001$) and negatively related to turnover intention ($\beta = -.12$, $p < .001$).
 Hypothesis 2: We predicted that job satisfaction would be negatively related to turnover intention ($\beta = -.15$, $p < .05$).

Hypothesis 3: We predicted that work engagement would be negatively related to turnover intention ($\beta = -.04$, $p < .05$).

Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations among study variables.

| Variables | Mean | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
|--------------------------|-------|------|--------|--------|------|------|--------|------|------|------|---|----|----|----|
| 1 Age | 31.58 | 6.73 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 Education | 1.38 | 0.49 | 0.07 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 Gender | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.02 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 Tenure with supervisor | 4.37 | 3.68 | 0.22** | 0.06 | 0.06 | | | | | | | | | |
| 5 Organization dummy | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0.42** | 0.32** | 0.07 | 0.04 | | | | | | | | |
| 6 Supervisor undermining | 1.67 | 0.80 | 0.15* | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.19** | .96 | | | | | | |
| 7 Political skill | 4.55 | 0.84 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.04 | .92 | | | | | |
| 8 Voice | 4.36 | 1.24 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | | | | |

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Table 2. Comparison of measurement models of key study variables.

| Model | Description | χ^2 | d.f. | CFI | TLI | RMSEA | $\Delta\chi^2$ (d.f.) |
|-------|---|----------|------|------|------|-------|-----------------------|
| 1 | Hypothesized seven-factor model | 618.20 | 303 | 0.95 | 0.94 | 0.06 | Baseline |
| 2 | Six-factor model (job satisfaction and turnover intention combined) | 1623.85 | 309 | 0.80 | 0.77 | 0.13 | 1005.65 (6)** |
| 3 | Five-factor model (work engagement, job satisfaction, and turnover intention combined) | 1631.72 | 314 | 0.80 | 0.77 | 0.13 | 1013.52 (11)** |
| 4 | Four-factor model (psychological empowerment, work engagement, job satisfaction, and turnover intention combined) | 2002.39 | 318 | 0.74 | 0.72 | 0.14 | 1384.19 (15)** |
| 5 | Three-factor model (voice, psychological empowerment, work engagement, job satisfaction, and turnover intention combined) | 2479.89 | 321 | 0.67 | 0.64 | 0.16 | 1861.69 (18)** |
| 6 | Two-factor model (political skill, psychological empowerment, work engagement, job satisfaction, and turnover intention combined) | 2764.27 | 323 | 0.63 | 0.60 | 0.17 | 2146.07 (20)** |
| 7 | One-factor model | 4821.78 | 324 | 0.32 | 0.26 | 0.23 | 4203.58 (21)** |

N = 266; **p < 0.01. The hypothesized seven-factor model served as the baseline model. All alternative models were compared with it. CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = Root mean squared error of approximation.

Results

Measurement Model. The seven-factor measurement model showed good fit, $\chi^2(303) = 618.20, p < 0.05, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.94$.

Structural Model.

The structural model showed good fit, $\chi^2(303) = 618.20, p < 0.05, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.94$.

The path coefficients are shown in Figure 1. The path coefficients are shown in Figure 1.

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Table 3. HLM analyses for hypothesis testing.

| Variables | Model 1: Psychological empowerment | Model 2: Psychological empowerment | Model 3: Psychological empowerment | Model 4: Work engagement | Model 5: Work engagement | Model 6: Job satisfaction | Model 7: Job satisfaction | Model 8: Turnover intention | Model 9: Turnover intention |
|------------------------------------|--|--|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Intercept | 4.95 (0.21)** | 4.99 (0.19)** | 4.92 (0.18)** | 4.08 (0.26)** | 4.10 (0.25)** | 4.86 (0.28)** | 4.88 (0.28)** | 3.51 (0.31)** | 3.50 (0.30)** |
| Age | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.04 (0.01)** | 0.04 (0.01)* |
| Education | 0.08 (0.12) | 0.04 (0.11) | 0.08 (0.11) | 0.09 (0.15) | 0.07 (0.15) | 0.08 (0.17) | 0.11 (0.16) | 0.07 (0.18) | 0.05 (0.18) |
| Gender | 0.32 (0.64) | 0.47 (0.59) | 0.24 (0.56) | 1.02 (0.81) | 0.96 (0.80) | 0.47 (0.87) | 0.42 (0.86) | 0.38 (0.93) | 0.43 (0.92) |
| Tenure with supervisor | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) |
| Organization dummy | 0.19 (0.18) | 0.12 (0.15) | 0.09 (0.14) | 0.08 (0.19) | 0.10 (0.19) | 0.26 (0.22) | 0.23 (0.22) | 0.07 (0.25) | 0.05 (0.24) |
| Supervisor undermining (SU) | 0.15 (0.07)* | 0.20 (0.07)** | 0.21 (0.07)** | 0.26 (0.10)** | 0.21 (0.10)* | 0.28 (0.11)* | 0.23 (0.11)* | 0.36 (0.12)** | 0.31 (0.12)** |
| Voice | | 0.33 (0.04)** | 0.29 (0.04)** | 0.36 (0.06)** | 0.30 (0.07)** | 0.29 (0.07)** | 0.22 (0.07)** | 0.01 (0.07) | 0.07 (0.08) |
| SU voice | | 0.04 (0.05) | 0.00 (0.05) | 0.00 (0.08) | 0.00 (0.08) | 0.10 (0.08) | 0.10 (0.08) | 0.04 (0.09) | 0.04 (0.09) |
| Political skill (PS) | | | 0.27 (0.06)** | 0.26 (0.09)** | 0.19 (0.09)* | 0.21 (0.10)* | 0.14 (0.10) | 0.21 (0.10)* | 0.16 (0.10) |
| SU PS | | | 0.05 (0.08) | 0.03 (0.11) | 0.01 (0.11) | 0.02 (0.12) | 0.03 (0.12) | 0.04 (0.13) | 0.05 (0.13) |
| PS Voice | | | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.06) | 0.03 (0.06) | 0.07 (0.07) | 0.06 (0.07) | 0.00 (0.07) | 0.01 (0.07) |
| SU Voice PS | | | 0.11 (0.05)* | 0.18 (0.07)** | 0.16 (0.07)* | 0.19 (0.08)* | 0.16 (0.07) | 0.17 (0.08)* | 0.15 (0.08) |
| Psychological empowerment | | | | | 0.23 (0.09)** | | 0.25 (0.09)** | | 0.21 (0.10)* |
| Variance (Level 2 intercept) | 0.204 | 0.114 | 0.092 | 0.141 | 0.120 | 0.252 | 0.201 | 0.358 | 0.346 |
| Variance (Level 1 residual) | 0.708 | 0.607 | 0.549 | 1.159 | 1.129 | 1.306 | 1.277 | 1.471 | 1.450 |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.013 | 0.234 | 0.325 | 0.237 | 0.259 | 0.201 | 0.225 | 0.134 | 0.149 |
| ^a Pseudo R ² | 0.012 | 0.094 | 0.109 | 0.066 | 0.028 | 0.051 | 0.030 | 0.043 | 0.018 |
| Deviance | 712.443 | 658.079 | 628.851 | 820.020 | 813.236 | 862.869 | 856.055 | 901.317 | 896.906 |

N 266. *p 0.05; **p 0.01. Table entries represent unstandardized parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Values in bold are relevant to tests of hypotheses.

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Discussion

Supervisor undermining behaviors (SUs) are a common phenomenon in the workplace (e.g., Farina & Hesse-Biber, 2012; Farina, 2007). However, the underlying mechanisms of SUs are not fully understood (e.g., Farina & Hesse-Biber, 2012; Farina, 2007). This study contributes to the literature on SUs by examining the role of moral identity (MI) in the relationship between SUs and organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs). The results show that MI moderates the relationship between SUs and OCBs, such that the negative relationship is weaker for employees with high MI. These findings have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.

Theoretical implications

Implications for the supervisor undermining literature. Research on SUs has primarily focused on the effects of SUs on employee well-being and organizational performance (e.g., Farina, 2002; Farina, 2019; Farina & Hesse-Biber, 2012; Farina, 2007). However, the underlying mechanisms of SUs are not fully understood (e.g., Farina & Hesse-Biber, 2012; Farina, 2007). This study contributes to the literature on SUs by examining the role of MI in the relationship between SUs and OCBs. The results show that MI moderates the relationship between SUs and OCBs, such that the negative relationship is weaker for employees with high MI. These findings have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.

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Practical implications

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Limitations and additional future directions

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~~Forrest, J. P.~~
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Supplemental material

[Supplemental material](#)

Note

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