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Corruption is commonly understood as use of public office for private gains by self-dealing government officials. Another kind of corruption that is almost equally prevalent is corruption by confidants of government officials, via their influence on the public office for private gains. We develop a model of strategic information revelation where a social welfare maximizing government official, after consulting a non-corrupt bureaucrat, has the option to seek additional information from his confidant, who in turn may channel information from her clients after collecting bribery from the latter. Our study addresses the following questions: (a) Whether corruption can arise despite, or even because of, the official¡¯s aim to maximize social welfare, and (b) whether such corruption can lead to efficiency loss. Our analysis differentiates two kinds of bribery: that to get things done (as is commonly understood) and that to insure things from being undone. In both cases, we show that bribery exhibits complementarity and hence requires scale: one client bribes when all clients bribe; suggesting the possibility of multiple equilibria. Three implications arise from this analysis: (1) corruption by confidant can be a cultural phenomenon; (2) having benevolent officials alone does not stop corruption; (3) fighting corruption should not be limited to preventing officials from engaging in self-dealing, instead attention must be given to the process of public decision-making.

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